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Chin-Shu Huang, Jea-Yao Lee, and SLaikn-Shen Ghenl 
This paper analyzes government's optimal shareholding strate@ 
within the framework of the mixed oligopoly. It is found that: (1) 
When both public and domestic firms have the same cost 
coefficient, the government's best policy is to adopt the full 
mixed oligopoly. (2) When the cost coefficient of the public firm 
is lower than a threshold value, the government should opt for 
a full mixed-oligopoly policy. However, when the public firm's 
cost coefficient is higher than the threshold value, the govern- 
ment should privatize the public firnl completely and exit the 
market. The single mixed oligopoly is just an alternative 
proposal when it fails to transform all of the private firms into 
mixed ownership enterprises. 
Keywords: Public firm, Mixed oligopoly, Privatization, Mixed 
ownership enterprise 
JEL Classifiiation: D43, L2 1, L51 
China had for long adopted planned economy by 1979, and it 
had seriously distorted her industrial structure and resource 
allocation. Beyond it, there were other issues waiting to be kclded 
with and improved upon: The loss of entrepreneurial compctitive- 
ness, insufficient labor incentive, and notorious rent seelung 
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problem. (Lin, Cai, and Li 1994). How to improve the production 
efficiency and raise the market competitiveness remains the 
quintessential issue for China's economic reform. Although a 
planned economy restrains the monopoly power of a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), the SOEs are allowed to sell excess output a t  
market price. Besides, in the early stage of the gradual reform, 
non-state enterprises, compared to the dominant role of SOEs, play 
only a cameo role. Such a market incentive induces SOEs to 
produce more. Literature abounds regarding the SOEs' production 
behavior when there is no entry of non-state enterprises.1 (See 
Byrd (1989), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)' and Zhou (1994)) 
With the continuous implementation of the open policy, China is 
marching toward the socialism-market economy. Among all the 
factors needed in this transformation, the entry of lion-state 
enterprises is the essential one. It is widely regarded that non-state 
enterprises have become one of the main ingredients of China's 
economy. (Noughton 1994; Zhou 1997; Sullivan 1998; Huang and 
Li 2000; Huang, Liu, and Wang 2001, etc.) Needless to say, China's 
economic reform has achieved some appreciable results. In the 
wake of bubbling reform of the SOE, China intends to promote the 
concept of a modem enterprise system in order to transform the 
SOEs into an independent economic unit in the market. Equity, 
one form of capital structure in modem enterprises, facilitates the 
separation of ownership from management in order to enhance 
both operational efficiency and capital efficiency. Form 1997 to 
2001, the number of share-holding enterprises (or HOES) increases 
from 72,000 to 300,000, with the corresponding increase in number 
of employees from 6,437,000 to 27,466,000. In addition, realized 
annual revenue leaps form $RMB 831.1 billion to $RMB 5.6733 
trillion. From the survey of PRC's national industrial union, a t  least 
25.7% of the private enterprises are transformed from SOEs to 
COEs while 8% and 13.9% are ready to merge or acquire SOEs 
respectively. According to Workers Daily, mixed ownership enter- 
prises account for around 40% of PRC's economy. In a half or one 
more decade, the percentage is expected to increase to around 80%. 
'According to Qian and Xu (1995), the non-state enterprise refers to 
enterprises which are not owned by the state government. This includes 
COEs (collectively owned enterprises) and other types of enterprises such as 
privately owned, foreign invested and other joint venture enterprises. 
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Wei Li-chun, Director of Research Office of the State Council, has 
recently pointed out that PRC is going to make shareholding 
enterprises the model system of SOEs, according to the resolution 
of PRC's three-central committees. The government's determination 
to promote mixed ownersl?ip economy suggests that China's 
government has more comprehensive and deeper understanding of 
the relationship between SOEs and non-SOEs. Mixed ownership 
system translates into a mixed economy equipped with state, 
collective, and other non-state capitals. Its purpose is to assert 
SOEs' dominant role and exert their leadership and efficiency in 
production. This is comparable to the privatization of enterprises in 
industrialized countries. Since 1980, the major effort has been 
made to minimize red tape, loss of competitiveness, and the rigidity 
of the internal organizational structure, and as such has enhanced 
the efficiency of SOEs. Take British Telecommunication Corporation 
for example, the British government periodically sold out shares of 
the corporation: Releasing 50.Z0h, 25.9%, and 20.7% of its equity in 
1984, 1991, and 1993 respectively, instead of a full-fledged priva- 
tization a t  one time. Thus, the process of the privatization, the role 
and function of the state capital in a mixed ownership economy 
may well adjust to the changing economic environments. 
Merrill and Schneider (1966) first explore the case in which the 
government affects the operation of an industry via a public firm 
that maximizes social welfare while competes with a profit- 
maximizing private firm in the market. 'llney showed that entry of a 
public firm into the industry could indeed improve the social 
welfare by reducing the market price and increasing the quantity. 
Such an industry characterized by competition between the public 
and private firms is lrnown as mixed oligopoly. In recent years, 
study of the mixed oligopoly has received more and more attention. 
Some relevant issues such as market strategies of public firms, 
subsidy and tax policies of the government, privatization of public 
firms and strategic trade policy are widely discussed under the 
model of mixed oligopoly. (See De Fraja and Delbono (1989). Cremer, 
Marchand, and Thisse (1989), Fershtman (1990), Katsoulacos (1994). 
Barros (1995), White (19961, George and La Manna (1996). Fjell and 
Pal (1996). and Pal and White (1998)). 
Some of the prior studies are on the full privatization of SOEs; 
that is, the transformation from pure public to pure private 
ownership firms. Little attention has been paid to the partial 
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privatization where the government still retains some shareholding. 
Mastsumura (1998) indicates that neither the pure public nor the 
pure private is socially optimal in the duopoly and closed economy 
model. And he states that the government should indirectly control 
the target function of the firm through shareholding in order to 
achieve the optimum privatization. His paper, however, neglects 
how the optimum privatization is affected by the existence of 
foreign firms and the number of domestic firms. 
Recently, Weng, Lo, and Liu (2003) have extended the models of 
Matsumura (1998) and Fjell and Pa1 (1996), and discussed the 
optimum privatization of the SOE within the framework of mixed 
oligopoly when both public and private firms have homogeneous 
technology. Our paper argues that the degree of optimum priva- 
tization increases with the number of domestic private firms. 
However, the effect of the number of the foreign firms on the 
optimum privatization cannot be determined: It depends on the 
ratio of domestic firms to foreign firms. Interestingly, De Fraja and 
Delbono(1989) compare the social welfare under four marlret 
structures: Oligopolistic market of nationalization, mixed oligopoly 
with Cournot competition, the public firm acting as a Staclcelberg 
leader, and pure private oligopoly. I t  is found that the social 
welfare under nationalization always outperforms that under the 
public firm with the Staclrelberg leadership, which is in turn better 
than that under Cournot-1Vash competition in mixed and pure 
oligopoly. The assumption of homogeneous technology may have 
accounted for this result, which leads to the conclusion that the 
best policy of the government is to take over all the private firms: 
Nationalization. 
In other words, the conclusion of Weng, Lo, and Liu (2003) may 
not lead to the best policy for the society or government. In this 
paper, it is suggested that under the goal of social welfare 
maximization, the government can not just sell off its stock shares, 
but should also adopt a more comprehensive optimal policy by 
taking the market structure and operational efficiency into 
consideration. That is, in the presence of great discrepancy in the 
operational efficiency among public and private firms, the optimum 
policy may be a full privatization. But if the discrepancy is not 
significant, by changing the shareholding of all the private firms 
could be the optimum policy in terms of welfare improvement. 
In this research, we propose a mixed oligopoly model, and 
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discuss how a government determines the optimum privatization of 
public firms when private firms have the same and different cost 
structure in comparison to the public firm. We compare social 
welfare and the government policies under full mixed ownership, 
single mixed ownership and full privatization policy. In what 
follows, section I1 discusses the assumption. Section 111 focuses on 
the government's optimum shareholding policy in the case when 
the cost coefficient is the same. Section IV investigates the same 
when the cost coefficient is different. Section V explores the 
dynamic effect of government sell-off. Section VI provides a 
conclusion and suggestions for future studies. 
PI. The Model 
We assume that there are one public firm, rn domestic private 
firms and n foreign private firms in a market of Cournot 
competition with the demand function given by P=a-Q, where Q is 
the total output, Q=qs+ C Z l  qpi+Cj'=l q ~ .  - q,, qpi and q ~ i  are output 
for the public firm, the i th private firm and the j th foreign firm 
respectively. The cost function2 of the public firm is Cs=F+ 
(csq:/2), where c, is a constant (cs>O) and F denotes the fixed 
cost. (F>O). The larger c, is, the less efficient the firm will be. The 
cost structures for the private firm and the foreign firm are C,i=F+ 
2 (c, q2,i/2) and CJ =F+ (c, q j /2 )  respectively, where c,, > 0,  and c, 2 c,, 
indicating that the efficiency of the private firm is no less than that 
of the pubIic firm. Without the loss of generality, we assume that 
F = O .  That is, the entry cost is not considered here. 
Given the assumption above, the profit functions for the public, 
the private, and the foreign firms are as follows: 
This research. following the previous literature, assumes that all firm's 
costs (entry cost) are zero. See Weng, Lo, and Liu (2003). Pal and White 
(1998). White (1996), and Fjell and Pal (1996) for reference. 
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We assume that all finns, except for the public firm, seek 
maximum profit while the goal of the public firm is to maximize 
social welfare. The welfare maximization problem for the public firm 
is: 
... 
Max. S W =  n , + C S + x  n,~ 
(4.1 i =  1 
(4) 
B 
where C S =  so P(x)&-PQ=Q~/z,  denotes the domestic consumer 
surplus. 
We assume that the government attempts to achieve the 
privatization by selling the stock, and as such enables the public 
firm to turn into a mixed ownership enterprise. Furthermore, we 
also assume that the proportion of the private shareholding is B 
(0 I9 < 11, while that of the government shareholding is (1 - 19). 
Being a mixed ownership enterprise, the decision of the firm rests 
on the goals of both government and the private sector. It is, 
therefore, assumed that a convex combination of the profit and 
social welfare can be expressed in terms of optimal shareholding. 
Thus, the maximization problem for the mixed ownership enterprise 
is:3 
We assume that, the optimum decision of shareholding and the 
output is based on a full information sequential game. It is 
essentially a three-stage game. First, government chooses the best 
shareholding policy.4 Then, given the optimum shareholding policy, 
3See Katsoulacos (1994) and Weng. Lo, and Liu (2003). To simplify the 
model, we also assume that the mixed ownership enterprise has the same 
cost coefficient as that of the public firm. In other words, the government's 
release on stocks can only affect the firm's production level, but has little 
impact on the production efficiency. 
4The government choose the optimal number of mixed ownership firms 
h* between 0 and m + l .  However, we, in this study, assume that the 
government can issue seasoned equity offerings or acquire more equities 
without extra cost, and the mixed ownership firms have their fixed cost 
zero. These assumptions will result to comer solution to the optimal 
number of mixed ownership finns. On the other hand, to contrast with 
before literature, we only study full nationalization, single mixed oligopoly, 
full mixed oligopoly, and full privatization, these four strategies in this 
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the government decides the optimum sell-off. Finally, the mixed 
ownership enterprise has the Cournot eornpetition with all other 
firms in the market. To achieve the subgarne perfect Nash 
equilibrium for government's best shareholding, we use backwards 
induction. 
A. Cournot Competition in Single Mixed Oligopoly 
To obtain the Cournot solution (q%, q;i, and dj), the deratives of 
Equation (2) a t  qpi, Equation (3) at qrj and Equation (5) a t  qs must 
equal zero. Solving these three first order conditions for q$, q;i, and 
Gj,5 we have 
We further have P, Q*, and CS*: 
a2(1+n+rnB+(rn+n)cs+~p12 cs* = 
2 ~ :  
where N 1 = l + n +  Bt rnB+( l+  B)cp+c,(l+rn+n+cp). 
Proposition 1 
When the private shareholding (0 )  of the public firm (a single 
research. 
The second order conditions are assumed to hold. That is, ( a 2 § /  8q:) = 
- 1 -  0 - cd0 .  (a2npt/ aq~L)=-l-rn-cp<O and (a2nflldc&)=-1-n-c,<0. 
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mixed ownership enterprise) is greater, the market price and the 
output of any firms (including domestic ones and the foreign ones) 
will increase. The output of the public firm, the total output of the 
marlre-t and the consumer surplus is expected to decrease. 
From the proposition 1, it is found that the reduction of public 
firm's shareholding decreases its output and causes the private 
firms to produce more output. The influence of the former 
dominates the latter.6 leading to the reduction of the overall market 
output, pushing up the market price, and decreasing the consumer 
surplus. 
Substituting the Equations (6)-(9) into the Equations (1)-(3), we 
get: 
E"roposition 2 
If the private shareholding of the public firm is greater, the profit 
of both the domestic and the foreign firms are expected to increase. 
Moreover, if the privatization of the public firm is not adequate - - 
( 0 <  0, 0={(1 +cp)(l +n+cp)+n(l  +rn+n+cp)cs)]/{(l +cp)(l +m+2n+cp) 
+n( l  +rn+n+cp)cs]), the profit of mixed ownership enterprise will 
rise as well; otherwise, it will decrease. 
The variation on the proportion of equity sell-off certainly will 
affect public firm's profit. Its profit moves in the same direction 
with the private shareholding 0 first, before s w e ~ n g  toward the 
opposite directions. Given that d nz/d0= (MR, - MCs)dqs/dO, and 
We can express this result as - dq:i d d  I 2; I>1rnxtn--l. do 
Let 8.. ((n- 1 -c,,)c3/(2+2cp+ nc,) and 828, it follows immediately that 
nsrO. It is to be pointed out that, 3< 8. 
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dqs/d8<0, the influence of 19 on the public firm's profit rests on 
the relative impact of the output variation on its total return (TR,) 
and total cost (TC,). In other words, when the difference of the 
marginal revenue (MR,) and the marginal cost (MC,) is negative, 
then (dn$/d0) >0;  otherwise, (dn:/d6) <0.  In the case when 0 is 
near zero (in the range of 8 <  8). it can be shown that the public 
firm is expected to be highly concerned with the social welfare, and 
a s  such produces more out.put, rendering MR,<MC, (MR, may be 
negative). Under such a condition, if 0 increases. n, is expected to 
increase. But with the continuous increase in 0, the public firm's 
concern for the profit grows stronger. When 6 >  8, its output will 
be relatively small, making P/IRs>IMCs. Thus, the increase of 8 is to 
have negative impact on n,. 
With the continuous increase of the equity sell-off, the public 
firm may well reduce its output, giving private firms opportunities 
to increase their outputs. This would certainly hamper the strategic 
effect of profit shifting.8 
B. The Optimum Equity Sell-Off of the Single Mixed Oligopoly and 
Its Social Weqare 
Now, we proceed to discuss how the government determines the 
optimum equity sell-off ( 0 )  for the single mixed oligopolistic public 
firm. In order to achieve the best equity sell-off, the government 
will consider the relationship between 0 and the Cournot equilib- 
rium output. Therefore, the government's problem of seeking the 
optimum 6 is: 
'The public firm's concern with the welfare (expressed as 1 - 8 in this 
paper), actually, makes its production behaviour more aggressive, helps the 
public firm establish its dominant role in the market, and acquire the 
strategic effect of shifting the profit of the private firms' to the public firm 
(the profit shifting strategic effect). As long as the equity sell-off accelerates. 
the public firm's production behaviour will become more conservative, and 
this would lower the strategic effect. See Fershtman (1985). Fershtman and 
Judd (1987). Gal-Or (1993). Sen (1993), and Barros (1995) for detailed 
discussion. 
260 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Substituting Equations from (6) to (8) into Equation (15). and 
assuming the derivative of Equation (15) a t  8 equals zero, we can 
obtain the optimal equity sell-off9 
Brsposition 3 
When the public firm is a single mixed oligopolist. (1) the higher 
the public firm's cost coefficient or a greater number of the private 
firms is, the higher the optimal government equity sell-off pro- 
portion (19)  will be; (2) the higher the domestic private firm's cost 
coefficient is, the lower the optimal government equity sell-off will 
be. 
Generally speaking, a large cost coefficient of the public firm 
implies the lower production efficiency and a s  such the public firm 
ought to reduce its output. Therefore, holding all other conditions 
unchanged, the government should increase its equity sell-off. On 
the contrary, a large cost coefficient of the private firm implies that 
the public firm's production efficiency is greater. The public firm 
should increase its output level. As a consequence, the government 
should decrease its equity sell-off, ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, when the private firm's production efficiency is greater 
or there are more domestic firms in the market, government should 
aslr domestic firms to produce more. On the other hand it should 
aslr the public firm to decrease its output in order to increase the 
overall social welfare. In this scenario, the government should 
increase the equity sell-off of the public firm. 
m o s i t i o n  4 
When the cost coefficient of the public firm (c,) is more than F,  
the number of foreign firms correlates positively with government's 
optimal equity sell-off. Otherwise, it correlates negatively, where 
'we can obtain B i >  8. That is, any B value that deviates from the 
equilibrium 0,; will decrease the profit of the SOE. 
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The effect of change in the number of foreign firms on the 
optimal privatization is uncertain. It depends on the ratio of the 
cost coefficient to the total number of firms. On one hand, when 
the number of foreign firms increases, ihe government is expected 
to increase the proportion of equity sell-off, which is the same as 
the case in which the number of domestic firms increases. On the 
other hand, when the number of private firms increases, the 
government is expected to lower the proportion of equity sell-off in 
order to facilitate the profit shifting from the private firms to the 
public firm. In general, when the cost coefficient of the public firm 
of the mixed oligopoly, is higher ( cs>F), the government tends to 
increase the equity sell-off. Otherwise, the government would 
decrease the equity sell-off. 
Finally, given the proportion of equity sell-off 0$, the profit of 
each firm and the social welfare can be solved by Equation (6)-(8). 
In particular, the social welfare is: 
C. The Best Equity Sell-08 of the Full Mixed Oligopoly and Its 
Social Wevare 
Following the previous result, we discuss the best equity sell-off 
in the full mixed oligopoly model, and explore the corresponding 
social welfare. The full mixed oligopoly implies that there are I +rn 
mixed-ownership enterprises. That is, in addition to the govern- 
ment's equity sell-off of the public firm, it also has a role in the 
decision making of the private firms. To put it simply, all the 
domestic firms will be turned into stated own enterprises first 
before facing the problem of the optimal equity sell-off.10 
The optimal equity sell-off and the social welfare are: 
10 The objective function of them is defined as a convex function of own 
profit and social surplus. 
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Evident from Equation (18). 82 is irrelevant to r n ,  implying that 
in the presence of n private domestic firms, the government will not 
take the number of domestic private firms into consideration 
regarding the optimum equity sell-off. The optimal equity sell-off for 
rn+ 1 domestic public and private firms is the same as that of 
single public firm. That is, when rn=O,  then @;= 8;. 
Furthermore, when rn>O,  82 increases with rn, and this leads to 
021 0;. In other words, the government's optimal equity sell-off 
(8;) for the single public firm, given the existence of rn domestic 
firms ( rn>O) ,  will be larger than 8: in the case of the full mixed 
oligopoly in which no private domestic firms exist ( rn=O) .  Under the 
single mixed oligopoly, the government attempts to take advantage 
of the domestic private firm's low cost to secure more production, 
while reducing the public firm's production. This provides ex- 
planations for @:> @:. 
We can also explain @:< @& from the discrepancy of production 
efficiency between the public firm and domestic firms. First, given 
the full mixed oligopoly, all domestic firms are mixed oligopoly with 
the same production efficiency, and thus the government has the 
incentive to lower the optimal equity sell-off in order to increase 
the domestic production. In contrast, it would discourage the 
production of foreign firms, and uphold the domestic firms' 
competitiveness in the market. Second, under the single mixed 
oligopoly, there exist some domestic private firms with better 
efficiency than that of the public firm, and these firms' costs are 
comparable to those of foreign firms. The government, therefore, 
can increase the public firm's equity sell-off, and need not worry 
about their competitiveness. 
HI. The Government's Optimal Shareholding Policy in the 
Case of Identied Cost Coefficient 
This section malres use of the method suggested in Weng, Lo, 
and Liu (2003) and De Fraja and Delbono (1989). We discuss the 
government's best shareholding policy in the case of identkal cost 
coefficient. In other words, we are to compare the social welfares of 
different shareholding policies: Full nationalization, full mixed 
ownership oligopoly, single mixed ownership oligopoly, and full 
privatization models. As can be seen from the analysis (with the 
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same cost), neither the single mixed oligopoly nor the full 
nationalization is the best strategy for the government. The 
optimaliq involves a complete intervention in the domestic private 
firms' operation; that is, to turn all the private firms' into the 
enterprises of mixed ownership. 
Assuming c,=c,=k and using Equations (16) and (17). we can 
obtain the optimal equity sell-off (8;) and social welfare (SW;) 
from Weng, Lo, and Liu (2003) as shown below: 
The social welfare (SW:) under the full nationalization (Bs=O) 
and the social welfare (sw:) under the full privatization (Bp= 1) are 
shown below: 
From Equations (18) and (19), we can obtain the optimal equity 
sell-off ( 8; )  and the social welfare ( SW;) under the full mixed 
oligopoly: 
A comparison of these four shareholding poIicies and social 
welfare measures leads to 
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Note that when m=O, then B;:= 6; ; when m>O, then B:> 0;. 
In terms of social welfare measures, we have 
SW$>SW~, when k is sufficient large. 
Proposition 5 
In the case when both public firm and private firms have the 
same cost coefficient, the social welfare under the policy of the full 
mixed ownership oligopoly achieves its maximum, implying that the 
government's best shareholding policy is the full mixed ownership 
oligopoly. 
From the result above, we can conclude that the government's 
best policy when both public firm and private firms have the same 
cost coefficient is to (i) nationalize all the domestic firms first, and 
then (ii) decides their best equity sell-off proportion. As a result, 
competition prevails between all mixed ownership enterprises and 
foreign firms in the market. 
IBr. Government's Best Shareholding Policy m e n  There Is 
Cost Diseregamcy 
In the presence of a cost (coefficient) discrepancy between the 
public firm and private firms, the shareholding policy will only 
affect the firm's production level, rather than its the production 
efficiency. In the following section, we will proceed to discuss the 
improvement of production efficiency. For now, we investigate 
government's best shareholding policy. That is, we compare the 
social welfares under these three shareholding policies, including 
the full mixed oligopoly, the single mixed oligopoly, and the full 
privatization in order to shed light on the optimal government's 
policy. 11 
"As  the full nationalization dominates the strategy of the fkll mixed 
oligopoly, we do not discuss it here. 
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As in prior studies,lz the public firm is assumed to be completely 
privatized, and have the same objective function and cost coefficient 
as other domestic private firms. To put simply, there are rn+ 1 
domestic firms and n foreign firms engaging in the Cournot 
competition. The social welfare under the full privatization policy 
can be shown as: 
Comparing the social welfares measures under different policies. 
or S W ~ ,  S W ~ ,  and SW;, in Equations (17), (19), and (201, we have 
the following relation: 
(1) When cs> Cl, we have SW&SWE~,  where 
(2) Given cs>G. it can be shown that SW:>SW$. where 
(3) In the case of cs>Z3, it follows SW$>SW:, where 
It is noteworthy that 4>Fr>E2, To facilitate the comparison of 
S W ~ ,  SW;, and S W ~ ,  we assume m=n=2. In the cp-cs space, we 
have three lines L1, L2, and L3, representing c, equals cl, &, and E3 
respectively. The plane can be divided into four regions by the lines 
as shown in Figure 1. In what follows we explain implications when 
the coefficient set (c,, c,) lies in each region. Note that the area 
below 45" line implies that cprcs, which is clearly not feasible. 
Thus it will not be discussed in the paper. 
l 2  See Pal and White (1998) and White (1996) for reference. 
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~ G U R E  1
OP~IMAL SHAREHOLDING POLICIES (m = n = 2) 
IN THE CASE OF DIFFERENT COST COEFFICIENTS 
First, when the coefficient set (c, c,) lies in Region I, it implies 
that SW;>SW;>SW;. Besides, it suggests that the public firm's 
cost coefficient (or the mixed owned enterprise) is relatively larger 
than that of domestic private firms, signaling that the public firm 
is much less competitive than the private firms in terms of produc- 
tion efficiency. The social welfare under the full privatization, thus, 
is the highest, followed by. that under the single mixed oligopoly. 
The social welfare under the full mixed oligopoly policy is the 
lowest. The government's best policy, therefore, is to completely pri- 
vatize all firms by relinquishing all the equity holding on the firms. 
Second, when the coefficient set lies in Region 11, it implies that 
SW;>S@>SW~. As indicated before, the government's best policy 
is full privatization. Notice that the social welfare under the single 
mixed oligopoly is the lowest followed by that under the full mixed 
oligopoly. Third, when the coefficient set lies in Region III, it implies 
that SW&SW~*>SW$. Moreover, the cost coefficient of the public 
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firm (or the mixed owned enterprise) being not much higher than 
that of private firms, reflects that the production efficiency of the 
public firm is not much less than that of the private firms. The 
welfare under the full mixed oligopoly is the greatest, followed by 
that of full privatization, while that under single mixed oligopoly 
has the lowest value. The best policy for the government, therefore, 
is the full mixed oligopoly. 
Last, when the coefficient set lies in Region N, it implies that 
SW& S W ~ >  SW;. Furthermore, the cost coefficient of the public firm 
is just a thread higher than that of private firms, indicating that 
its production efficiency is similar to that of private firms. As 
before, the best policy of the government is the full mixed oligopoly. 
What differs this from the case of Region 111 is that the single 
mixed oligopoly is the second best policy, while the full 
privatization remains the last choice. This result is similar to the 
situation when c,=c,,, as was previously discussed. 
WopusiCion 6 
Assuming that E l  is the ceiling for the cost coefficient under full 
privatization, when the cost coefficient of the public firm (c,) 
exceeds F1, the government's best policy is full privatization; when 
c,<El, the government's best shareholding policy is a full mixed 
oligopoly; when c,=El, both full mixed oligopoly and full priva- 
tization are the best shareholding policies. 
We can conclude from the above discussion that when the public 
firm's cost coefficient is relatively high, government's optimal policy 
is a full privatization: It ceases to hold any stocks. On the 
contrary, when the public finn's cost coefficient is relatively low, 
the full mixed oligopoly is the optimum policy for the government. 
If the government, however, fails to achieve the full mixed oligopoly 
due to regulations or budgetary concerns, the second best policy 
may well be the full privatization; that is, the government should 
exit the market, and let the competition prevail. The plausible 
policy may be the single mixed oligopoly, i.e., at least holding some 
equity in mixed ownership enterprises. 
In what follows, we discuss how numbers of domestic and foreign 
firms affect the ceiling cost coefficient Ti. 
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&oposition 7 
When the number of domestic firms grows, the ceiling cost 
coefficient under full privatization is expected to decrease; when the 
number of foreign firms grows, the ceiling cost coefficient tends to 
rise. 
Proposition 7 suggests that with the increase in the number of 
domestic firms, competition tends to become fierce which improves 
the market efficiency. It also implies that the role for the 
government's intervention in the mixed owned enterprises are rather 
limited. In particular, it causes the ceiling cost to go domi. When 
the number of foreign firms grows, the effect of profit shifting by 
the mixed oligopoly will be strengthened. This indicates that the 
role played by the mixed oligopoly becomes important while causing 
the ceiling cost coefficient to increase under full privatization. At 
the same time, we can also conclude that when the public firm is 
turned into a mixed ownership enterprise, the production efficiency 
is expected to improve as well, rendering its cost coefficient to be 
lower than the ceiling cost coefficient E l .  A s  such government's 
optimal policy is a full mixed oligopoly. 
V. The Dynamic =feet of Government SeU-Wf 
In section IV, we assume that the government sell-off has no 
impact on the production efficiency of the public firm (or the mixed 
ownership); that is. sign[dc,/d0]=0 (Case 1). However, considering 
the dynamic effect of government sell-off proportion, the public firm 
production efficiency may improve with the rise of this sell-off 
proportion, which is sign[dcs/dO]<O (Case 2). On the other hand, 
the effect of cost coefficient rise on the social welfare is indefinite; 
that is, sign[aSW/ acs]$O. The exact effect of this rise depends on 
the exogenous variables. Under the conditions mentioned above, we 
can compare the first order condition of Case 1 with that of Case 
2. In the following: 
Case 1 
BW asw dcs asw ---- - + --- 
dB 
-0 *e: 
acS d e  a0 
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a=10, m=IO, n=10, c,=l, c,=5 
Full Mixed Oligopoly 
Single Mixed Oligopoly 
2, = c, 8=0.9099 SW=44.5432 
Fulf Mixed Oligopoly 
es = C, 0=0.7042 SW= 44.3005 
&= Ocp+(l - 0)cS 0=0.7915 SW=45.8141 
Single Mixed Oligopoly 
2, = c, 0=0.8502 SW=44.7162 
E, = Ocp+ (1 - 0)cS 0=0.8383 SW=44.9016 
Case 2 
-=-- ~ S W  asw dcS ~ s w - ~  +eg 
d 0  
+ -- a ~ ,  d e  ae 
(7) (-1 (7) 
With the production efficiency advance, the effect on the optimum 
sell-off proportion is indefinite; If aSW/ acs>O, then 82*< 0:; on the 
contrary, if dSW/ dc,<O, then 0;> 0; However, if the sell-off 
proportion increase does help production efficiency advance, the 
increase of social welfare is definite. 
There is a brief example to the point. We assume that the cost 
coefficient of the public firm is es = Ocp+ (1 - O)cs, and d&/d 0 =cp - cs 
<O. With exploitation of data analysis revealing a choice of 
different parameters, the following table provides the simulation of 
the optimum sell-off proportion and corresponding social welfare. 
When a=10, m=10, n=10, cp=l ,  a.nd cs=5, for both the full 
mixed oligopoly and single mixed oligopoly, the best sell-off 
proportion and social welfare increase with production efficiency 
advance. When a=10, m=10, n=10, cp=l ,  and cs=2, the best 
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sell-off proportion and social welfare also increase with production 
efficiency advance for full mixed oligopoly, but decrease for single 
mixed oligopoly. This explains that when there is great production 
efficiency discrepancy between the public firm and the private one, 
considering the dynamic cost lowering effect of sell-off proportion, 
the government will be willing to increase the sell-off for efficiency 
improvement. But as with only subtle efficiency discrepancy, the 
government will instead lower the sell-off in order to increase 
strategic effect of profit shifting. 
V'I. Conclusion and Suggestions 
Equity in the capital structure of modem enterprises plays an 
essential role; it facilitates the separation of ownership from 
management in order to enhance both the production efficiency and 
operation efficiency of capital. In the wake of reforms for SOEs, 
China expects to exert a leadership role in the stated owned 
economy via varying the degree of nationalization, and related 
nationalization methods, in the hope to establish modem ~wnership 
system via the mixed ownership approach. 
However, from the prior experience of the West, the leading role 
and function of the state capital will have to adjust to the changing 
economic environments. We employ the model of a mixed oligopoly 
to investigate the government's optimal shareholding policy. The 
analysis indicates: (I) When both the public firm and domestic 
firms have the same cost coefficient, government's best policy is a 
full mixed oligopoly. (2) When the public firm's cost coefficient is 
lower than the ceiling cost, the government should not only sell off 
the public firm's shareholding, but also turn all private firms into 
mixed owned enterprises. In other words, the government should 
implement a more comprehensive shareholding policy, and/or 
monitoring the operation of private firms. However, when the public 
firm's cost coefficient is greater than the ceiling cost, the govern- 
ment should privatize the public firm completely to prevent 
deterioration in economic efficiency. The equity sell-off policy of the 
single mixed oligopoly is just an alternative proposal when it fails 
to turn all of the private f i~ms  into mixed owned enterprises. 
This research mainly focuses on government's best policy in the 
presence of full information. Future research can be enriched 
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greatly if one considers the following scenarios. First what is 
government's best shareholding policy when firm's cost structure 
and demand structure are dominated by uncertainty. Second, 
relationship between best shareholding policy and industrial 
development, structure change (merger, entry and exit of firms, etc.) 
in an industry are considered. In addition R&D, the production 
quality, and the trade policy remain challenging topics for future 
research. 
(Received 20 June 2005; Revised 29 March 2006) 
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